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Schaffer: Academic Freedom in Trying Times (CLE)

A GUIDE TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM
by
Frederick P. Schaffer ∗
Introduction
This brief introduction to the principles of academic freedom is intended for
attorneys and other administrators who represent or work at colleges and universities. It
has two purposes. The first is to introduce them to academic freedom as a set of
professional principles regardless of whether or not they are legally enforceable.
Attorneys and administrators need to understand the culture of the institutions they
represent or serve. Nowhere is this more true than with colleges and universities, which
have well established traditions and norms that influence the expectations and conduct of
all those responsible for their governance, including faculty, administrators and trustees.
The second purpose is to introduce the law relating to academic freedom as it has
evolved over the last half century. As will become apparent, it is not always clear where
academic freedom as a set of professional principles ends and the law begins. Academic
freedom has received some recognition by the Supreme Court and considerably more by
the lower federal courts in connection with the application of the First Amendment to
cases involving both universities as institutions and the individual rights of faculty.
However, the meaning of academic freedom in the context of constitutional law is
confused. Apart from its constitutional dimension, academic freedom as a legal principle
results from its incorporation into contracts or collective bargaining agreements between
universities and faculty or into policies, guidelines or handbooks adopted or issued by
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universities that may or may not create contractual rights. It is not possible in an
introduction to the subject of academic freedom to cover these complex issues of contract
law and interpretation. Rather, the goal of the present work is to present what principles
are or are not part of the definition of academic freedom and how they may be fairly
applied in some of the most common contexts in which they arise.
This guide was the outgrowth of several meetings over the course of two years
sponsored by the Ford Foundation, as part of its “Difficult Dialogues Initiative,” and with
the active support of the National Association of College and University Attorneys. I have
benefitted greatly from the discussions at those meetings and from the comments of many
of its participants on drafts of this guide.
The Origins of Academic Freedom in the United States – The 1915 Declaration
The principles of academic freedom in the United States were heavily influenced
by the thinking and practice at German universities and the growth of nonsectarian
American universities in the second half of the nineteenth century. 1 With the rise of
ideological conflicts, especially relating to economic theory, faculty began to feel the need
for protection against trustees and/or administrators who sought the dismissal of faculty
whose views they found unpalatable.
In response to these conflicts, in 1915 the American Association of University
Professors was founded and issued its Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom
and Academic Tenure (the “Declaration”). 2 The Declaration begins by stating that
academic freedom of the teacher “comprises three elements: freedom of inquiry and
research; freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extramural
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utterance and action.” It then turns to three matters that it deems critical to understanding
these principles.
First, the Declaration considers the basis of academic authority, arguing that except
for proprietary and religious institutions, colleges and universities constitute a public trust.
This is true not only for state universities, but also for private universities because they
appeal to the general public for contributions and moral support in the maintenance of
non-partisan institutions of learning, not propaganda. Accordingly, their trustees have no
right to bind the reason or conscience of the faculty.
Second, the Declaration considers the nature of the academic calling, arguing that
the function of the faculty “is to deal first hand, after prolonged and specialized technical
training, with the sources of knowledge; and to impart the results of their own and of their
fellow-specialists’ investigations and reflection, both to students and to the general public,
without fear or favor.” This provides an important societal benefit by ensuring “that what
purport to be the conclusions of men trained for, and dedicated to, the quest for truth, shall
in fact be the conclusions of such men, and not echoes of the opinions of the lay public or
the individuals who endow or manage universities.” This emphasis on the independence
of faculty applies not only to their individual work as researchers and teachers, but also
appears to have implications for the shared governance of the institution: “A university is
a great and indispensable organ of higher life of a civilized community, in the work of
which the trustees hold an essential and highly honorable place, but in which the faculties
hold an independent place, with quite equal responsibilities – and in relation to purely
scientific and educational questions the primary responsibility.”
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Third, the Declaration considers the functions of an academic institution, which are
(a) to promote inquiry and advance the sum of knowledge; (b) to provide instruction to
students; and (c) to develop experts for public service. It argues that performance of each
of those functions requires faculty to have complete freedom to pursue their investigations
and discuss and publish their results and to express themselves fully and frankly both to
their students and to the public.
In short, the Declaration affirms that the university must provide an inviolable
refuge from the tyranny of public opinion: “It should be an intellectual experiment
station, where new ideas may germinate and where their fruit, though still distasteful to
the community as a whole, may be allowed to ripen until finally, perchance, it may
become a part of the accepted intellectual tool of the nation or of the world. Not less is it a
distinctive duty of the university to be the conservator of all genuine elements of value in
the past thought and life of mankind which are not in the fashion of the moment.”
Next, the Declaration counsels that the rights granted to university teachers by the
principles of academic freedom come with corresponding obligations. In the case of
scholarship, this means that “the liberty of the scholar within the university to set forth his
conclusions, be they what they may, is conditioned on their being conclusions gained by a
scholar’s methods and held in a scholar’s spirit; that is to say, they must be the fruits of
competent and patient and sincere inquiry, and they should be set forth with dignity,
courtesy, and temperateness of language.” In the case of teaching, this means that the
teacher “in giving instruction upon controversial matters, while under no obligation to
hide his own opinion under a mountain of equivocal verbiage, should, if he is fit for his
position, be a person of a fair judicial mind; he should, in dealing with such subjects, set
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forth justly, without suppression or innuendo, the divergent opinions of other
investigators; he should cause his students to become familiar with the best published
expressions of the great historic types of doctrine upon the questions at issue; and he
should, above all, remember that his business is not to provide his students with readymade conclusions, but to train them to think for themselves, and to provide them access to
those materials which they need if they are to think intelligently.”
According to the Declaration, however, the power to determine when violations of
those obligations have occurred should be vested in bodies composed of members of the
academic profession. Other bodies do not possess full competence to judge concerning
those requirements and may be viewed as acting on the basis of motives other than zeal
for academic integrity and the maintenance of professional standards. At the same time,
placing this authority exclusively in the hands of the faculty imposes a corresponding
obligation to police the standards of their profession. As the 1915 Declaration states: “If
this profession should prove itself unwilling to purge its ranks of the incompetent and the
unworthy, or to prevent the freedom which it claims in the name of science from being
used as a shelter for inefficiency, for superficiality, or for uncritical and intemperate
partisanship, it is certain that the task will be performed by others . . . who lack . . .
essential qualifications for performing it.”
The Declaration goes on to apply the same principles not only to scholarship and
teaching, but also to “extramural utterances” – that is, the expression of judgments and
opinions outside of the classroom – and political activities, even when they pertain to
questions falling outside the academic specialty of the faculty member. It notes that
“academic teachers are under a peculiar obligation to avoid hasty or unverified or
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exaggerated statements, and to refrain from intemperate or sensational modes of
expression.” However, as with speech within the university setting, the Declaration
counsels that the enforcement of such restraints should be, for the most part, through the
public opinion of the profession, or, if disciplinary action is appropriate, through bodies
composed of members of the academic profession.
The Declaration ends its discussion of this topic with an important point that
relates to all aspects of academic freedom: “It is, in short, not the absolute freedom of
utterance of the individual scholar, but the absolute freedom of thought, of inquiry, of
discussion and of teaching, of the academic profession, that is asserted by the declaration
of principles.”
The Declaration concludes with several practical proposals. One involves the
establishment of suitable judicial bodies relating to the dismissal or discipline of faculty
and the determination of claims that academic freedom has been violated. Others relate to
procedural protections that will safeguard academic freedom, including tenure, the right to
notice and a hearing before dismissal and the formulation of clear standards for dismissal.
Tenure is justified as providing assurance against interference with freedom in research
and teaching, especially against improper pressure by trustees. However, the Declaration
makes clear that tenure is not intended to immunize a faculty member against appropriate
disciplinary proceedings as long as they are conducted at a hearing before the faculty or a
committee of faculty.
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The Reiteration of the Principles of Academic Freedom – The 1940 Statement
In 1940, the American Association of University Professors and the
Association of American Colleges (today the Association of American Colleges and
Universities) agreed to a shorter version of the Declaration, now known as the 1940
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure. 3 The basic purpose of
academic freedom remained the same:
Institutions of higher education are conducted for the
common good and not to further the interest of either the
individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The
common good depends upon the free search for truth and its
free exposition.
Academic freedom is essential to these purposes and applies
to both teaching and research. Freedom in research is
fundamental to the advancement of truth. Academic
freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for the
protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of the
student to freedom in learning. It carries with it duties
correlative with rights.
The 1940 Statement, together with its 1970 Interpretive Comments, has
been endorsed by almost 200 organizations and scholarly associations and adopted by
many colleges and universities across the United States. It is often incorporated into or
referenced in faculty contracts. Because the definition of academic freedom set forth in
the 1940 Statement is used so widely, it is worth quoting in full:
(a) Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in
the publication of the results, subject to adequate
performance of their other academic duties; but research
for pecuniary return should be based upon an
understanding with the authorities of the institution.
(b) Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in
discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to
introduce into their teaching controversial matter which
has no relation to their subject. Limitations of academic
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freedom because of religious or other aims of the
institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time
of the appointment.
(c) College and university teachers are citizens, members of
a learned profession, and officers of an educational
institution. When they speak or write as citizens, they
should be free from institutional censorship or
discipline, but their special position in the community
imposes special obligations. As scholars and
educational officers, they should remember that the
public may judge their profession and their institution by
their utterances. Hence they should at all times be
accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should
show respect for the opinions of others, and should make
every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the
institution.
The 1940 Statement goes on to deal with the subject of academic tenure. It provides:
“After the expiration of a probationary period, teachers or investigators should have
permanent or continuous tenure, and their service should be terminated only for adequate
cause, except . . . under extraordinary circumstances because of financial exigencies.” The
reason for tenure, and its protection, is to ensure both “freedom of teaching and research
and of extramural activities” and “a sufficient degree of economic security to make the
profession attractive to men and women of ability.”
Judicial Recognition of Academic Freedom
In the 1950’s and 1960’s the concept of academic freedom found its way into
several opinions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with statutes barring the
employment of faculty who had belonged to subversive organizations or who refused to
take a loyalty oath. Those opinions connected academic freedom to the freedom of speech
and association protected by the First Amendment; however, neither a complete definition
of academic freedom nor its legal basis was fully developed or firmly established.
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In Wieman v. Updegraff 4 the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that
disqualified persons from serving as faculty members of a state university if they had
belonged at any time to a Communist or subversive organization. The Court ruled that the
statute deprived state employees of due process by failing to afford them notice and an
opportunity to demonstrate that they had joined such an organization without awareness of
its subversive intent. In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice
Douglas, laid out the case for protecting universities as centers of independent thought and
criticism. 5
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire 6 the Court reversed on narrow procedural grounds a
contempt citation issued to a professor who had refused to appear in response to a
subpoena issued by the state attorney general to answer detailed questions about a lecture
he had delivered on socialism as a guest of the University of New Hampshire. Writing for
a four-Justice plurality, Chief Justice Warren described the following “liberties in the area
of academic freedom” enjoyed by faculty:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should
underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by
those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and
universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field
of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that
new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true
in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students
must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate,
to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die. 7
In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter, on behalf of himself and Justice Harlan,
focused more directly on the intellectual life of the university, quoting at length from a
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conference report prepared by faculty, trustees and chancellors of non-segregated South
African universities, of which the following excerpt is best known:
“It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four
essential freedoms of a university – to determine for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.” 8
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents 9 the Court for the first time invoked the principle
of academic freedom in a majority opinion in a case striking down a state law subjecting
faculty members to removal for “treasonable or seditious utterances or acts.” Quoting
several lower court opinions, the Court wrote:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us, and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore
a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom. “The vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools.” The classroom is peculiarly the
“marketplace of ideas.” The Nation’s future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth “out of a multitude
of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.” 10
Through these decisions, and numerous decisions of lower courts, academic freedom was
established as a legal principle, possibly with constitutional underpinnings, which
protected faculty from termination based on ideological disagreement with their teaching,
scholarship, political associations or extramural utterances.
Notwithstanding this development, the concept of academic freedom has fared less
well in the courts in the ensuing decades. The reasons for this are complex and relate to
issues that are best considered separately and more fully. It is sufficient to note at this
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point the comment of one scholar that the Supreme Court “has been far more generous in
its praise of academic freedom than in providing a precise analysis of its meaning.” 11
Faculty Rights and Institutional Autonomy
As noted above, the impetus for the 1915 Declaration was primarily to protect
faculty from ideologically motivated attacks by trustees and administrators – that is, from
within the university. By contrast, the cases from the 1950’s and 1960’s tended to involve
governmental intrusions on academic freedom. Not surprisingly, there developed an
emphasis on the freedom or autonomy of the university as an institution. That emphasis
has continued in more recent Supreme Court cases involving challenges to an action,
practice or policy of the institution rather than the rights of an individual faculty
member. 12
One possible exception to that trend is Regents of the University of Michigan v.
Ewing. 13 In that case the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a student’s challenge to his
dismissal from a joint undergraduate and medical program on the ground that it violated
his right to due process. The decision to dismiss the student had been made after careful
review by the faculty Promotion and Review Board and affirmed by the Executive
Committee of the Medical School. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens emphasized not
only the Court’s “reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational
institutions and our responsibility to safeguard their academic freedom,” 14 but specifically
the role of the faculty:
The record unmistakably demonstrates, however, that the
faculty's decision was made conscientiously and with careful
deliberation, based on an evaluation of the entirety of
Ewing's academic career. When judges are asked to review
the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this
one, they should show great respect for the faculty's
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professional judgment. [FN 11] Plainly, they may not
override it unless it is such a substantial departure from
accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person
or committee responsible did not actually exercise
professional judgment.
*

*

*

FN 11. “University faculties must have the widest range of
discretion in making judgments as to the academic
performance of students and their entitlement to promotion
or graduation.” (Citations omitted) 15
In sum, the Supreme Court has at various times recognized that both strands – the
institutional autonomy of universities and the rights of faculty – are part of academic
freedom. 16 However, in none of these cases did the result turn on which strand of
academic freedom was emphasized because in all of them the interests of the faculty and
the institution were aligned to repel a common external threat. 17 Some lower courts have
recognized that the First Amendment protects the academic freedom of individual faculty
members, 18 while others have held that it protects only institutional autonomy. 19 (Legal
scholars are similarly divided on the issue. 20) Whether focusing on the faculty or the
institution, however, lower courts have tended to give great deference to any decision
concerning a matter of academic judgment, including not only judgments regarding
students but also the tenure or promotion of faculty. 21
What does not appear from reading the court decisions applying the principles of
academic freedom to First Amendment claims is the important role of grievance
procedures established by both university governance and collective bargaining in
developing and protecting the principles of academic freedom. In such proceedings,
faculty regularly assert their individual rights to academic freedom and, where
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appropriate, prevail in cases involving intrusions not only from outside the university, but
also within the university. 22
Although the right of the faculty to free inquiry and the autonomy of the university
are both critical to the meaning of academic freedom, they do not always mean the same
thing or point in the same direction. As the Supreme Court noted in Regents of the
University of Michigan v. Ewing: “Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent
and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat
inconsistently, on autonomous decision-making by the academy itself.” 23 The Supreme
Court has provided no guidance as to what should happen when a faculty plaintiff invokes
academic freedom as insulation against an adverse institutional decision while in the same
case the institution invokes its academic freedom to be free from control, and lower court
decisions are often inconsistent and unhelpful. 24 However, as a general matter, the correct
approach should be apparent from the core principles of the doctrine of academic freedom:
faculty members should be protected in their freedom to teach and conduct and publish
scholarly research, subject only to academic judgment of their peers. 25 Where the adverse
decision complained of is the result of such a judgment, expressed through the ordinary
procedures of university governance, it is not a violation of academic freedom, and courts
should refrain from intervening. 26
This conclusion flows from the fact that although academic freedom provides
faculty with individual rights, they are far from absolute. Even the core principles of
academic freedom in research and teaching are subject to the judgment of other faculty. 27
It is the faculty collectively who decide on what constitutes original and valuable
scholarship sufficient for promotion or tenure, what courses should be taught, what
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syllabus should be followed and what readings should be assigned, and even what grades
should be awarded to students. 28 Individual faculty members have the right to participate
in these decisions; and as a practical matter their recommendations are often followed
although academic administrators, up to and including the president, generally have the
final word. Nevertheless, the key point is that academic decisions are to be made by the
academy as a body, not by any single individual. In short, all faculty members are subject
to the judgment of their peers.
This principle, which is fundamental to the reasoning of both the 1915 Declaration
and the 1940 Statement, may be criticized as hopelessly naïve, based as it is on the
widespread belief of the Progressive Era that there existed such a thing as expertise, and
that properly trained experts could be relied on to make fair and unbiased judgments that
would lead to an objective truth. In the current era of Post-Modernism, that belief, at least
outside the natural sciences, has been aggressively challenged. Academic politics may
produce results based as much on ideology and intellectual fashion as any other sort of
politics. However, if a space is to be preserved for the intellectual freedom necessary for
critical inquiry, the final decision must generally rest with persons who share the training
and traditions of the academy. The occasional errors and injustices thereby produced are a
necessary price for that freedom. Otherwise, the decisions will be made by others who
have their own biases but share neither the intellectual training and discipline of academic
discourse nor the tradition of free inquiry. 29
This is not to say that there is never any recourse from decisions made by faculty
bodies or administrators on issues involving scholarship or teaching. Decisions relating to
appointments, tenure and promotion are subject to laws prohibiting discrimination just like
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employment decisions in other contexts. Furthermore, where there is evidence that a
decision was made on the basis of factors extraneous to the proper exercise of academic
judgment, it does not violate the principles of academic freedom for such a decision to be
reviewed, whether through the internal procedures of the university itself, or if such
procedures do not exist, by the courts. However, the standard for review should be
demanding. It should generally involve deference to the decision of the faculty unless
there is clear evidence that the decision was not the result of academic judgment, bearing
in mind that such judgment may appropriately include preferences for scholarly
approaches or methodologies (as opposed to particular views or conclusions).
Another question concerning the two strands of academic freedom is whether the
concept of institutional autonomy is necessarily derivative of the faculty’s freedom of
inquiry or whether universities have a zone of freedom from outside interference that
belongs to them as institutions without reference to the role of the faculty. In the view of
this author, the two strands of academic freedom are inextricably connected and both are
essential. Institutional autonomy is justified because universities provide the collective
setting in which scholars subject the work of their peers to review based on their expertise.
Within that context, the advancement of the academic enterprise requires individual
faculty to be free to pursue the truth in their scholarship and teaching without adverse
consequences unrelated to the quality of their work. Thus, academic freedom can serve
the public good only if universities as institutions are free from outside pressures in the
realm of their academic mission and individual faculty members are free to pursue their
research and teaching subject only to the academic judgment of their peers.
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Nevertheless, it is worth considering two contexts in which the institutional
autonomy of the university may appear unrelated to the rights of faculty. One such
context is student admissions. As noted above, Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring
opinion in Sweeny, included the decision as to “who shall be admitted to study” as one of
the “four essential freedoms of a university.” That view was echoed by Justice Powell in
his concurring opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 30and Justice
O’Connor in the opinion of the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger 31 upholding the affirmative
action plan adopted by the faculty of the University of Michigan Law School. Justice
O’Connor’s opinion explicitly states that the Court’s conclusion that the racial diversity
of the student body is a compelling state interest rests on the Court’s deference to the
“Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational
mission”; such deference, the opinion continues, is consistent with its traditional
recognition that “given the important purpose of public education and the expansive
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.” 32
However, the idea that admissions standards or policies are among the principles
of academic freedom does not appear in either the 1915 Declaration or the 1940
Statement. Moreover, although the establishment and implementation of standards and
policies concerning admissions may once have been a faculty prerogative, they are now
often the responsibility of administrators and boards of trustees, at least at the
undergraduate level. Thus, this is an area where the institutional autonomy of the
university may be somewhat separate from the role of the faculty. However, it should be
noted that the autonomy of a university over admissions has received only weak
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recognition. The Court in Grutter (by a bare majority) was willing to give weight to the
academic decision of the University of Michigan Law School (and other educational
institutions that filed briefs as amicus curiae) to the effect that racial diversity furthered
the educational goals of such institutions. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that it would violate
academic freedom (as opposed to some other value or principle) if a board of regents, a
state legislature or the voters in a referendum impose a different set of admissions
standards or policies upon a public university or professional school. 33 Policies relating to
admissions, especially in the area of affirmative action, involve less academic expertise
and more of the kind of public policy choices usually decided by democratic means than
such issues as the evaluation of scholarship or the proper content of the curriculum. 34
A second context in which institutional autonomy has recently been asserted
involves the gathering of evidence from universities by government investigators or
private parties in connection with litigation. In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC 35 the
Supreme Court held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission did not violate
academic freedom in requiring a university to turn over confidential peer-review materials
pursuant to a subpoena issued in its investigation of a Title VII claim filed by a faculty
member who had been denied tenure. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Blackmun
distinguished earlier academic freedom cases that involved “direct” infringement
regarding the content of academic speech or the right to determine who may teach. 36 By
contrast, Justice Blackmun found that the burden imposed by the subpoena on the
university’s ability to determine who may teach was at most indirect since the EEOC was
not seeking to impose mandatory criteria on the university in selecting faculty. 37 One
commentator has conjectured that “perhaps because the party invoking academic freedom
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was a university, the Court made no mention, even obliquely, to the interests a faculty
member might have in engaging in peer review without external coercion.” 38 However,
the Supreme Court clearly understood the claim that the confidentiality of the peer review
process was important to the process of evaluating faculty even though the party invoking
that claim was the university. It simply disagreed that this claim was sufficiently strong to
overcome the government interest in obtaining relevant evidence in the investigation of a
discrimination complaint. 39
That balance tends to shift when the government or private parties seek to use
compulsory process to obtain the research or teaching materials of faculty. Where faculty
members are expert witnesses, they are, of course, subject to the same scope of discovery
as other similarly situated persons. Thus, for example, the publisher of a book by an
expert witness may be compelled to produce the peer reviews obtained before publication,
but an expert witness may not be required to turn over the draft of a book on which she is
working. 40
When a faculty member is not serving as an expert witness, subpoenas for the
research or teaching materials may require an especially strong justification where they
impinge on First Amendment rights that faculty share with all citizens. 41 Some courts
have shown particular concern for academic freedom in this context. 42 Indeed, in one
case, the court provided to research scholars the same protection from discovery that it had
previously afforded journalists insofar as the confidentiality of sources was implicated. 43
In addition to the need for confidentiality, it might also be argued in this context that the
academic freedom of scholars includes their right to decide when, where and how to
present their research findings. Their research should not be commandeered into the
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service of others in cases or controversies in which they are not serving as expert
witnesses. 44
A similar argument could be made in favor of protecting faculty materials and
communications concerning their research or teaching against disclosure under open
records or freedom of information laws applicable to public universities. 45 However, state
courts have consistently rejected the argument for an academic freedom privilege or
exemption in this context, although some state laws provide varying degrees of
protection. 46
Such protection should be afforded whether the subpoenas or requests are issued to
individual faculty members or to their universities or research institutes. The degree of
and rationale for protection are the same in either case. Thus, in this area, as in almost
every other, the individual’s freedom of inquiry and the university’s autonomy are two
aspects of the same principle of academic freedom.
Academic Freedom and Free Speech
Of the three elements of academic freedom, the freedom of “extramural utterance
and action” is surely the most problematic. Unlike freedom in research and teaching, it
has no special connection to the university and no justification based on the special
expertise of faculty members to judge the quality of the work of their peers based on
academic standards. Indeed, both the 1915 Declaration and the 1940 Statement refer to
the right of faculty to speak as citizens. 47 However, we do not ordinarily think of the right
of citizens to speak and associate freely as a function of their professional or occupational
status. Accordingly, in most contexts, the freedom of faculty “to speak publicly on
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matters of public concern reflects the permeation of the campus by general civil rights
rather than an elaboration of a right unique to the university.” 48
This development has been a mixed blessing. The First Amendment limits the
power only of government. Thus, private colleges and universities are not restrained by
its terms, and their faculty members are not thereby protected. 49 Furthermore, the status
of faculty at public universities subjects them to the narrower scope of free speech
afforded to public employees generally. First, the protection afforded to a public
employee’s free speech depends on the application of a balancing test between the
employee’s interest in the expression and the interest of the employer in promoting
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. 50 Second, the First
Amendment protects the speech of a public employee only when he is speaking as a
private citizen on a matter of public concern and not merely a matter of personal interest. 51
It is therefore doubtful under this test that constitutional protection exists for many aspects
of faculty speech relating to internal university matters. 52 Finally, as the Supreme Court
held in Garcetti v. Ceballos, public employees enjoy no freedom of speech when their
speech or expression is made “pursuant to their official duties.” 53
In Garcetti the Supreme Court rejected the free speech claim of a prosecutor who
had been fired allegedly in retaliation for his testimony on behalf of a criminal defendant
to the effect that a sheriff’s deputy obtained a search warrant by means of a false affidavit.
The Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” 54 Since
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the parties stipulated that the speech in question was made pursuant to the employee’s
duties, the Court dismissed the complaint.
The Garcetti case presented a context that was quite different from a public
university, and the Court acknowledged that difference. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Souter expressed a concern that the decision might “imperil First Amendment protection
of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak
and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’” 55 In response, Justice Kennedy wrote:
Justice Souter suggests today’s decision may have important
ramifications for academic freedom, at least as a
constitutional value. There is some argument that
expression related to academic scholarship or classroom
instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that
are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary
employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that
reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today
would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech
related to scholarship or teaching. 56
The Supreme Court provided some clarification to the meaning of Garcetti in Lane
v. Franks. 57 Lane was the former director of a community college’s program for
underprivileged youth, who fired Schmitz, a counselor, who was also a state
representative, for failing to show up for work. This lead to a federal investigation and
indictment of Schmitz. Lane testified about his reasons for firing Schmitz before a federal
grand jury and, pursuant to subpoena, at both criminal trials; the second trial resulted in a
conviction. Not long thereafter, during a period of financial difficulties, the college laid
Lane off. He sued alleging retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment right to free
speech. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and the
Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that Lane’s speech was made pursuant to his
official duties as a public employee and was therefore not protected by the First
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Amendment under Garcetti. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[t]ruthful
testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is
speech as a citizen for First amendment purposes.” 58 The Court distinguished Garcetti on
the ground that the memorandum at issue in that case was commissioned by the employer,
and was therefore made pursuant to his official responsibilities whereas Lane’s testimony
was compelled by subpoena and was therefore speech as a citizen, not part of his official
responsibilities. As the Court reasoned, “the mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns
information acquired by virtue of his public employment does not transform that speech
into employee . . . speech.” 59 Thus, the Court concluded that “[t]he critical question
under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an
employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” 60
The lower courts have wrestled with the application of Garcetti to free speech
claims of faculty members in public universities. 61 First, there is the question of when are
faculty members speaking pursuant to their official duties. Most courts have interpreted
this concept broadly, including speech related not only to activities that may be specified
in a written job description or faculty handbook, but also to pretty much everything that
faculty traditionally do within the university setting, at least where the speech was directed
to others within that setting. 62 By contrast, speech by faculty members directed to
audiences outside of the university, such as letters to the editor of a newspaper, articles for
popular magazines or speeches in non-academic settings, have not been viewed as within
their official duties. 63
Second, there is the question of what significance should be given to Justice
Kennedy’s caveat and whether to carve out an exception from the Garcetti analysis for
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speech relating to scholarship or teaching. Some courts appear to have ignored the issue
of academic freedom but did so in cases that did not involve speech relating to scholarship
or teaching. 64 Others have explicitly held that speech relating to scholarship or teaching is
protected by the First Amendment. 65 So far only a few courts have addressed the meaning
of “speech relating to scholarship or teaching”. In one case, the court interpreted that
category rather narrowly, holding that a librarian’s recommendation of a book for
freshman reading in connection with orientation is not speech relating to teaching. 66 More
recently, the Ninth Circuit held that a professor’s plan concerning the faculty structure of a
school of communications, written while he served on a committee that was debating
some of the issues addressed by his plan, constituted speech related to scholarship or
teaching because it was a proposal to implement a change “that, if implemented, could
have substantially altered the nature of what was taught at the school, as well as the
composition of the faculty that would teach it.” 67
This broader definition of speech relating to scholarship or teaching seems
appropriate. If academic freedom is to be adequately protected, it would seem at a
minimum that the covered category of speech should include not only what is written in
scholarly articles and spoken in the classroom, but also statements made in connection
with such activities as the evaluation of the scholarship of others, the establishment of
curricula and academic standards and structures and the academic advising of students.
More generally, courts need to recognize that faculty participate in the governance of
institutions of higher education in ways that are fundamentally different from other public
agencies. Unlike other public employees, faculty are expected to exercise independent
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thought and judgment on university governance rather than carry out the mandate of their
agency head. 68
Finally, courts will need to continue to refine the application of the balancing test
to a university context. This involves primarily the determination of what constitutes a
matter of public concern as opposed to a matter of merely personal interest. 69 Not
everything a teacher might say deserves the protection of the principles of academic
freedom. 70 This includes speech in a classroom that does not relate to the subject matter
of the class and is profane, sexual or otherwise objectionable. 71 It also includes speech on
issues of internal organization, performance or personnel matters that are not of public
concern. 72 However, one court has held that speech on an issue of academic organization
may have wider implications about the future course of a public university and therefore
may constitute a matter of public concern. 73 Similarly, another court has held that the
letter by an adjunct faculty member, written in her capacity as the head of a union and on
behalf of its members, which deplored the treatment of part-time faculty and her college’s
over-reliance on them to the detriment of the students, involved a matter of public
concern. 74
However the courts eventually resolve these First Amendment questions
concerning faculty speech at public universities, academic freedom is a concept
independent of constitutional law. The question therefore arises whether the principles of
academic freedom should establish norms within universities that are more protective of
extramural speech than the First Amendment, even if they cannot be enforced by courts.
At both private and public institutions of higher education, academic freedom should
continue to protect speech in which faculty speak as citizens on matters of public concern.
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Although not directly related to the primary rationale for academic freedom, such freedom
of expression is part of a long and valued tradition of universities as places committed to
wide-ranging debate on such matters. 75 There is no good reason why any faculty, whether
at private or public universities, should be subject to reprisals because colleagues,
administrators, alumni or politicians take umbrage at the expression of views on subjects
of public concern. 76 Moreover, the boundaries of what constitutes matters of public
concern should be interpreted broadly. At least some matters pertaining to university
issues, such as presidential pay, conflicts of interest by trustees and significant change in
general education requirements or academic standards, are of real and legitimate interest
to the larger community.
In addition, if the Supreme Court does not eventually recognize the need for
expanded protection for speech relating to scholarship or teaching, or interprets those
categories narrowly, or does not also include speech relating to academic governance as
deserving of similar protection, a strong argument can be made for continuing to protect
such speech under the umbrella of academic freedom as applied within the setting of the
university itself.
Some would argue further that academic freedom should also protect speech
unrelated to matters of public concern or to scholarship, teaching or academic
governance. 77 However, it is far from clear why such speech has value to the academic
enterprise and should be protected by principles of academic freedom. Moreover, the
recognition and enforcement of such a broad concept of academic freedom within
universities would inevitably give rise to endless disputes and grievances as faculty claim
retaliation for every adverse action. Internal procedures already exist at most universities
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to review decisions relating to reappointment, promotion and tenure on the ground that
they were based on extraneous factors and not on the quality of scholarship, teaching and
service. That seems not only appropriate but consistent with principles of academic
freedom, which are premised upon the integrity of a system of academic judgment and
peer review. However, academic freedom is in no way advanced by requiring the review
of a morass of petty retaliation claims arising in contexts where there does not exist formal
review procedures, such as departmental disagreements as to course content, class
schedules or the selection of department chairs, 78 and where there is no connection to the
core values of scholarship or teaching. 79

Academic Freedom and University Governance
The 1915 Declaration is explicit that academic freedom requires the faculty to play
the central role in making academic judgments about scholarship and teaching and in
disciplining faculty for failure to meet appropriate standards. The 1940 Statement is silent
on issues of governance. However, in 1966 the AAUP adopted a Statement on
Government of Colleges and Universities (the “Statement on Government”), which it had
jointly formulated with the American Council on Education and the Association of
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges. 80 The Statement on Government
emphasizes the need for shared responsibility by boards, faculties and administrators. It
notes that the role of each group and the form of their cooperation will vary depending on
the area in question. Like the 1915 Declaration, it gives the faculty primary responsibility
for academic matters based on their expertise and goes on to define those matters as
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“curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and those
aspects of student life that relate to the educational process.”
In 1998 the Association of Governing Boards issued its own Statement on
Institutional Governance. 81 The AGB Statement notes “a widespread perception that
faculty members, especially in research universities, are divided in their loyalties between
their academic disciplines and the welfare of their own institutions” and the belief of many
governing boards, faculty and chief executives that “internal governance arrangements
have become so cumbersome that timely decisions are difficult to make, and small
factions often are able to impede the decision-making process.” While acknowledging the
important role of faculty regarding academic matters, the AGB Statement emphasizes “the
ultimate responsibility” of governing boards, the role of other constituencies, such as
students, non-faculty staff and external stakeholders and the need for the fiscal and
managerial affairs of universities to be “administered with appropriate attention to
commonly accepted business standards.” The variations between the AAUP Statement
and the AGB Statement reflect not only the different perspectives of the associations that
issued them, but also the differing practices of the many universities and colleges within
the United States. Nevertheless, as a matter of practice it is fair to say that faculty
generally have strong but not dispositive authority over such critical academic matters as
curriculum and appointments. 82
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of university governance in two vastly
different contexts. In NLRB v. Yeshiva University 83 it held that the faculty members of
that institution did not have the right to organize under the National Labor Relations Act
because they were “managerial employees.” The Court contrasted the “shared authority”
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of Yeshiva University, which had a fairly typical governance structure, with the
“pyramidal hierarchies of private industry.” 84 Indeed, the Court went on to recognize the
value of such shared authority by noting “[t]he university requires faculty participation in
governance because professional expertise is indispensable to the formulation and
implementation of academic policy.” 85 Notwithstanding its recognition of the policy
arguments in favor of such shared authority, in Minnesota State Board for Community
Colleges v. Knight 86 the Supreme Court held that faculty have no First Amendment right
to participate in academic governance at a public institution of higher education. 87
Where does this leave the idea of shared governance as a component of academic
freedom? It seems clear that a substantial faculty role in the academic governance of the
university is a sine qua non for academic freedom even if it is not a matter of
constitutional right and may not be subject to judicial enforcement. 88 However, there will
continue to be considerable disagreement as to the exact contours of that role. The AAUP
Statement on Government maintains that the president and the board should overrule the
faculty “only in exceptional circumstances, and for reasons communicated to the faculty”
and goes on to identify financial constraints or personnel limitations as the kinds of factors
that might justify the rejection of a faculty recommendation. 89 Nevertheless, many
university presidents are members of the faculty and have deep experience in exercising
academic judgment. Moreover, even if one were to agree that presidents should generally
defer to the faculty on academic matters (and boards even more so), it seems entirely
appropriate for them to review faculty decisions where there is evidence that they may not
have rested on academic judgment. 90
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Tenure and Other Procedural Safeguards
Tenure has been considered an essential component of academic freedom in the
United States from the outset. It is based on the reasonable assumption that established
scholars and teachers will feel and exercise greater independence of thought if they can be
dismissed only for weighty reasons and with considerable difficulty. 91 There are, of
course, policy arguments that can be made against tenure because it removes some
incentives for greater scholarly effort and protects senior faculty who have ceased to be
productive. It may be countered that tenured faculty remain motivated by their need for
self-esteem and the recognition of their peers and that, in any event, any loss in
productivity is outweighed by the gain in intellectual independence. Whatever the merits
of the debate, tenure or the possibility of tenure remains a fact of life for a substantial
portion of faculty positions at institutions of higher education. However, in an era of
increasing fiscal constraints and oversupply of candidates, most faculty in the United
States today are no longer in tenure-track positions, including a large number who work
for long periods on a part-time basis. 92
Tenure was never intended to guarantee unconditional or lifetime job security to
faculty. The 1915 Declaration recognizes that tenured faculty may be dismissed. As
noted above, it does not attempt to set forth the legitimate grounds for such dismissal, but
rather directs each institution to establish them “with reasonable definiteness.” The 1915
Declaration goes on to recommend certain procedural safeguards in cases of dismissal
applicable to both tenured and untenured faculty. It provides that in cases not involving
academic judgment (such as “habitual neglect of assigned duties”), lay boards may decide
whether there is cause for dismissal, but that in cases involving the utterance of opinion or
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an issue of professional competence, only a body composed of faculty should be permitted
to decide. 93 Furthermore, the 1915 Declaration provides that prior to dismissal or
demotion, a faculty member should receive a specific, written statement of charges and be
entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which he can present evidence, including reports from
other teachers and scholars if the charges involve incompetence. 94 The 1940 Statement
has similar provisions. 95 In both documents, these procedures are applicable only to the
dismissal for cause of full-time faculty who are tenured or, if untenured, before the
expiration of the term of their appointment.
Most universities provide these procedural safeguards in connection with
proceedings to dismiss full-time faculty, whether or not they have received tenure. In
addition, full-time faculty at public institutions enjoy the protection of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To determine what process is constitutionally due,
the Supreme Court generally balances three factors: “First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest.” 96
With respect to the first factor, the right to due process arises only when a person is
deprived of a liberty or property interest. A liberty interest includes a person’s reputation
or standing in the community. Thus, the right to due process would be triggered if there
are charges that might seriously damage such interests. 97 A property interest arises when
an individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
held that public college faculty dismissed from a tenured position or during the terms of
their contracts have interests in continued employment that are safeguarded by due
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process. 98 By contrast, professors who are not reappointed after the expiration of the term
of their appointment have not been deprived of any property interest and are not entitled to
a statement of reasons or a hearing. 99 In a similar vein the Supreme Court has suggested,
and several lower courts have held, that suspension of a faculty member with pay does not
constitute a deprivation of a liberty or property interest and therefore does not implicate
due process concerns. 100
In cases where “it is determined that due process applies, the question remains
what process is due.” 101 This question is well settled as a matter of constitutional law
(although many universities provide somewhat greater protection). In general, public
employees who may be dismissed only for cause are entitled to a very limited hearing
prior to their termination, to be followed by a more comprehensive post-termination
hearing; the pre-termination process need only include oral or written notice of the
charges, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity for the employee
to tell his or her side of the story. 102 Moreover, there are circumstances, such as where an
employee has been charged with a serious crime, where an employee may be suspended
without pay without any hearing at all, especially where he occupies a position of great
public trust and high public visibility or the suspension is necessary to maintain public
confidence. 103
Since the 1940 Statement the AAUP has issued several policy documents relating
to the dismissal of faculty as well as the renewal or nonrenewal of faculty appointment.
These include the 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal
Proceedings, the Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and
Tenure and the Statement of Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of
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Faculty Appointments. 104 Although some of their provisions resemble those in collective
bargaining agreements and internal administrative procedures at many universities, these
policy documents have not been widely endorsed or adopted by other organizations.
Some universities have adapted portions of these policies, while others have rejected them
entirely. Accordingly, they should be viewed as no more than recommendations by an
association representing the interests of faculty. 105
An issue closely related to procedural safeguards is the standard of conduct by
which faculty members should be judged in connection with dismissal. As noted above,
the 1915 Declaration recommended only that such standards be stated with definiteness
and left the substance to each university to determine. Not surprisingly, there are
considerable differences among universities. In its Recommended Institutional
Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, the AAUP requires “adequate cause” for
dismissal to be “related, directly and substantially, to the fitness of faculty members in
their professional capacities as teachers or researchers.” 106 Few universities have adopted
the AAUP standard. Its definition of adequate cause is too narrow to take into account the
full range of legitimate institutional interests of universities. For example, it is doubtful
that under the AAUP standard, a faculty member could be dismissed for conduct
unbecoming a member of the profession or even the commission of a crime (at least as
long as the victims were not other faculty members or students and the crime was not
committed on campus). However, in that connection, universities are entitled to consider
their interests in maintaining public confidence, attracting and retaining student
applications and enrollment and providing role models for students.
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Similarly, the AAUP’s 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty
Dismissal Proceedings provides that in connection with proceedings to terminate a faculty
member, suspension “is justified only if immediate harm to the faculty member or others
is threatened by the faculty member’s continuance.” 107 Most universities have regulations
or collective bargaining agreements that are not so restrictive and that permit suspension
in other circumstances, including when a faculty member has been charged with or
convicted of a serious crime, when the faculty member’s continued presence would
interfere with the operations of the university or when in the president’s judgment
suspension is otherwise necessary in the best interests of the university.
Academic Freedom and the Rights of Students
The principles of academic freedom do not apply to students as they do to faculty.
As discussed above, academic freedom serves to promote the public good by protecting
the intellectual independence of faculty in their scholarship and teaching, subject to the
professional judgment of their peers. Within the academic community, students are
novices, under the intellectual tutelage of the faculty. Their freedom of speech is not
properly understood as part of academic freedom because it has nothing to do with “the
preservation of the unique functions of the university, particularly the goals of
disinterested scholarship and teaching.” 108 That is not to say, however, that students do
not have any rights relating to the free expression of their views and opinions. Students at
public universities are protected by the First Amendment against restrictions on their
rights of free speech and association. 109 Indeed, in light of the limitations on the First
Amendment rights of public employees discussed above, it may be that students at public
universities have greater rights to free speech than faculty.

33
Published by The Keep, 2018

33

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 13 [2018], Art. 18

One of the most contentious areas of controversy concerning the First Amendment
rights of university students relates to “speech codes,” which have consistently been found
unconstitutional. 110 Another area relates to the use of student activity fees. In Southworth
v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin 111 the Supreme Court upheld the use of
mandatory student activity fees to fund student advocacy having educational benefit
against a claim that such a fee violates the First Amendment interest of students not to
have their money used to promote ideas with which they disagree. The Court reasoned
that the university’s educational interest in promoting speech by its students outweighed
the students’ interest as long as the university followed a strict policy of “viewpoint
neutrality” in the allocation of the funds collected from the mandatory fee. 112
As noted above in discussing the faculty’s freedom of expression in extramural
utterances, the university has come to serve an important function as a marketplace of
ideas outside the realms of scholarship and systematic learning. It may be analytically
correct to view this function as falling outside the protection of academic freedom.
Nevertheless, it is a tradition worth protecting and preserving as long as it does not
conflict with the core purposes of the university. Accordingly, students should enjoy
rights to free speech and association whether or not they attend a public university and
thus enjoy First Amendment protection. Both in the larger university setting and within
the classroom, students should be free to express their views, and they should not be
subject to reprisals because of their opinions. 113
This freedom of expression by students, however, is subject to two limitations.
First, it may not interfere with the other activities of the campus or classroom. This
common sense limitation is an accepted part of First Amendment jurisprudence and serves
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as the justification for reasonable limitations on the time, place and manner of protests and
other expressive activities both on and off university campuses. 114
Second, student speech and writing in the classroom context is subject to the
academic authority of their teachers to evaluate their course work with respect to factual
accuracy, authority of sources, research methodology, organization, quality of expression,
analytical rigor and other legitimate academic factors. The Supreme Court has supported
this limitation not only in Southworth but also in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier. 115 In that case the Court upheld a high school principal’s right to delete two
pages from a newspaper produced by students in connection with a journalism class. The
Court held that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial
control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.” 116 Of course, precedents from the K-12 context are not necessarily applicable
to higher education, where the greater age and maturity of students and the stronger
tradition of free inquiry militate in favor of greater student rights. Nevertheless, it remains
true that in both contexts students’ right to free speech in the classroom setting is subject
to the legitimate academic standards and concerns of the faculty and the institution.117
The authority of faculty, indeed their academic freedom, also extends to the design
of curricula and the presentation of materials. This is not primarily a question of their
individual rights as teachers but rather their collective authority as part of the academic
governance of the institution. The purpose of teaching is not merely to impart knowledge,
but to train students to think for themselves. The recent statement on Academic Freedom
and Educational Responsibility by the Association of American Colleges and Universities
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puts it well: “Students do not have a right to remain free from encountering unwelcome or
‘inconvenient questions.’” 118 At the same time, however, and as the 1915 Declaration
recognizes, faculty are expected to conform to professional norms with regard to avoiding
controversial topics unrelated to the subject matter of a course and presenting relevant
controversial materials in an academically thoughtful and rigorous way. 119
Most of the litigated cases in this area pertain not to controversial subject matters
or views but to the use of language by faculty that is profane or sexual. In several preGarcetti cases, the courts seem to have grasped the key principle here. On the one hand,
courts have dismissed claims by faculty that their rights to free speech or academic
freedom were violated because they were terminated for profane or sexual speech that was
unrelated to the subject matter of the class and that served no valid educational purpose. 120
On the other hand, courts have reversed a university’s discipline of a faculty member
where they found that language, although objectionable to some, advanced his valid
educational objectives related to the subject matter of his course. 121 Nevertheless, these
cases are troubling to the extent that courts in some of them reviewed and in one case
reversed the decision of a faculty committee as to what was appropriate, thereby intruding
upon the university’s autonomy in an area of academic judgment. 122
As with many cases involving student speech, these cases often arise in the context
of a university’s enforcement of a policy against sexual harassment. Two courts have
struck down such a policy because its language was unconstitutionally vague and
therefore violated a faculty member’s First Amendment rights. 123 A properly drafted
sexual harassment policy should survive such a challenge but must, of course, be
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interpreted and applied in manner that respects the right of free speech. As the Office of
Civil Rights has recently reiterated::
. . . the laws and regulations it enforces protect students from prohibited
discrimination and do not restrict the exercise of any expressive activities
or speech protected under the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, when a school
works to prevent and redress discrimination, it must respect the freespeech rights of students, faculty, and other speakers.
Title IX protects students from sex discrimination; it does not regulate the
content of speech. OCR recognizes that the offensiveness of a particular
expression as perceived by some students, standing along, is not a legally
sufficient basis to establish a hostile environment under Title IX. Title IX
also does not require, prohibit, or abridge the use of particular textbooks or
curricular materials. 124
However, where a professor’s speech is reasonably regarded as offensive, is not germane
to the subject matter of the course and is sufficiently severe and pervasive as to impair a
student’s academic opportunity, there is no reason why anti-discrimination laws cannot be
applied without violating faculty rights to free speech or academic freedom. 125
Another area of contention relates to the introduction of religious texts or subjects.
Where this has been done as part of an academic exercise and not to advance a particular
religious view, the courts have upheld the university’s actions against claims that they
violated the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. 126
Conversely, one court has upheld limitations on a faculty member’s speech about his
religious views within a classroom that appeared unrelated to the subject matter of the
course. 127
In sum, it is inconsistent with principles of academic freedom for faculty to have to
censor their speech within the classroom because of student objections where such speech
is related to the subject of the course. If their speech is not so related and is offensive to a
reasonable person, faculty may be appropriately restrained or disciplined. In either case, it
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is helpful in dealing with these types of controversies for universities to have internal
procedures to review complaints by students concerning faculty behavior in classrooms.
Such procedures should involve faculty in the review of student complaints and should
provide explicit protection for the principles of academic freedom. 128
Uses and Abuses of Academic Freedom
In the century since the AAUP issued the 1915 Declaration, the principles of
academic freedom have gained greater acceptance than its originators could have
imagined. There is hardly a university that does not at least profess its commitment to
academic freedom, although conformance to its principles, as always, tends to ebb and
flow with the phases of the political moon. Indeed, so widespread is the acceptance of
academic freedom that some use it to advance claims or proposals that have little or no
connection to its principles – or in fact are inconsistent with them. Some such claims
border on the silly. 129 However, two examples, from opposite ends of the spectrum, are
worth considering in more detail.
In his Academic Bill of Rights, 130 David Horowitz proposes principles to address
what he claims is a lack of intellectual and political diversity among university faculty and
a resulting tendency of faculty to use the classroom for indoctrination. 131 Several of those
principles consist of restatements of the traditional view of academic freedom. These
include the principles that (i) faculty should be evaluated based on their competence and
knowledge in their field of expertise; (ii) students should be graded on the basis of their
reasoned answers and appropriate knowledge of the subjects and disciplines they study;
and (iii) neither faculty nor students should be judged on the basis of their political or
religious beliefs.
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Others are consistent with the principles of academic freedom, but create pressures
against the exercise of intellectual independence or originality. For example, it is a valid
objective that curricula, reading lists and classroom teaching should expose students to a
range of significant scholarly opinion. However, it is not a simple matter to determine
precisely what that should include in order to protect faculty from charges of
“indoctrination” from their students or outside groups. As several scholars have
commented, the Academic Bill of Rights threatens to “snuff out all controversial
discussion in the classroom” by presenting faculty “with an impossible dilemma: either
play it safe or risk administrative censure by saying something that might offend an overly
sensitive student.” 132
Moreover, the Academic Bill of Rights seeks to implement its goal of neutrality in
teaching by requiring universities to recruit faculty "with a view toward fostering a
plurality of methodologies and perspectives," thereby creating a risk that faculty will be
hired based on their political beliefs, notwithstanding the Bill’s own prohibition on
precisely such behavior. This risk is exacerbated by modern telecommunications
technology. In the past, most scholarship was published in academic journals and books
that were not widely available, and criticism (generally from scholars) appeared in similar
venues. Now, however, almost everything that faculty write is available on line, and
commentary by both other scholars and the public (including highly ideological segments
of the public) is distributed widely through social media, blogs and other electronic
outlets. Although such commentary, even when vitriolic and unfair, is not itself a
violation of academic freedom, its widespread availability, including occasional
appearances on mainstream media, may well serve to intimidate some faculty.
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Finally, by seeking (so far unsuccessfully) the enactment of laws similar to the
Academic Bill of Rights by Congress and several state legislatures, its supporters invite
the kind of outside interference, from both legislatures and courts, that is inconsistent with
academic freedom. Here, as in so many debates concerning academic freedom, the issue
is not only what the proper principles are, but who gets to enforce them. As noted above,
academic freedom is based on the institutional autonomy of universities. The Academic
Bill of Rights, in its purported effort to strengthen academic freedom, would in fact
weaken if not destroy it. 133
Coming from the other direction, the AAUP’s vision of academic freedom has
been encumbered by the addition of numerous policies, procedures, rules and prohibitions
as an old ship accumulates barnacles. The AAUP, of course, deserves great credit for
having put academic freedom on the map and having investigated and reported on a
number of important cases involving significant violations of its principles. However,
there is hardly any aspect of university life on which the AAUP has not expressed an
opinion and which, according to the AAUP, is not an aspect of academic freedom. These
include such diverse matters as detailed procedures relating to the renewal or nonrenewal
of appointments, dismissal and suspension, including the permissible grounds for such
action, standards for notices of non-reappointment, the use of collegiality as a criterion for
faculty evaluation, post-tenure review, the status of part-time faculty, non-tenure track
appointments and the status of such faculty, the use of arbitration in cases of dismissal,
operating guidelines for layoffs in cases of financial exigency and so on. 134 This
development is understandable as the AAUP has worked over many years to further the
interests of faculty. Nevertheless, to link to academic freedom every policy and procedure
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that a professional association or labor organization might want for its members is to drain
the concept of all meaning and to lend credence to the unfortunate view of some that
academic freedom is no more than special pleading on behalf of a privileged elite.
Because there are, and will continue to be, real and serious threats to academic freedom, it
is important to all who care about universities to be clear about its meaning, to exercise
restraint in its invocation and to support true claims with vigor.

New York City
December 2015
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(7th Cir. 2008) (dispute over research grant); Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
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v. Sonoma County Junior College Dist., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at * 11 91431 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
2009) (court refused to dismiss faculty member’s First Amendment claim where complaint did not establish
that her attempts to place certain matters on the agenda for department meetings were pursuant to her official
duties). Courts have generally held that speech by teachers in the K-12 context was made pursuant to their
official duties. See Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2010) (complaints about the handling
of student discipline in public secondary school); Fox v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 605 F.3d
345, 348-350 (6th Cir. 2010) (elementary school teacher’s complaints about work load); Lamb v. Booneville
Sch. Dist., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9728 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2010) (special education teacher’s complaints
about corporal punishment). But see Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 595 F.3d 1126, 1137
(10th Cir. 2010) (complaints of wrongdoing by speech pathologist in public school system not made
pursuant to her duties); Evans-Marshall v. Board of Education of Tipp City Exempted Village School, 428
F.3d 223, 230 (6th Cir. 2005) (teacher comments on curricular and pedagogical decisions protected by First
Amendment).
63

See Adams v. Tr. of Univ. of North Carolina, 630 F.3d 550, 561-62 (4th Cir. 2011) (non-scholarly
columns and articles published outside the university are protected by the First Amendment even though
they were subsequently submitted by faculty member in support of application for promotion). See also
Niehoff, supra note 56, at 82-84. This distinction creates an odd incentive for faculty members at public
universities (and other state employees) to voice their complaints outside of the university (or chain of
command), rather than within. If the statements relate to a matter of public concern, the faculty are more
likely to be protected by the First Amendment. Furthermore, this distinction seems arbitrary in other ways.
It suggests that faculty members are speaking pursuant to their official duties when they write an article in a
scholarly journal or give a speech at a professional gathering, but not when they write an article in a popular
magazine or give a speech at a political meeting.
64

See, e.g., Renkin, 541 F.3d at 774; Hong, 516 F.Supp.2d at 1166.

65

In some of these cases, the court held that the speech related to scholarship and teaching. See Demers,
746 F.3d at 410-13); Adams, 640 F.3d at 562-64; Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F.Supp.2d 817, 843 (S.D. Ohio 2010);
Sheldon v. Dhillon, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110275 at *12 (N.D Cal. Nov. 25, 2009). In others, the court
recognized the exception for speech relating to scholarship and classroom teaching but held it was not
applicable. Abcarian, 617 F.3d at 938, n. 5; Pigee v. Carl Sandburg College, 464 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir.
2006); Savage, 716 F. Supp.2d at 718.
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66

Savage, 716 F.Supp.2d at 718. In a pre-Garcetti case, one court held that faculty members had engaged in
speech related to matters of public concern, and therefore were protected by the First Amendment, in
connection with objects displaced in a history exhibit. See Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 679-80 (8th Cir.
1997). However, in a secondary school context, a court held that an art teacher’s statements to his class
about the portfolio requirements of college art programs, including the necessity for providing sketches of
male and female nudes, were not protected by the First Amendment. Panse v. Eastwood, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55080 at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2007).
67

Demers, 746 F. 3d at 415.

68

For a thoughtful argument in favor of extending the protection of the First Amendment to faculty speech
relating to its role in the academic governance of universities, see Areen, supra note 17, at 985-1000. As
that argument makes clear, however, such protection requires a careful analysis of whether or not a
particular kind of speech relates to academic governance – a task that is far from easy. This author believes
that the Supreme Court is more likely to protect speech relating to such governance issues as the evaluation
of scholarship, the revision of curriculum and the structure of academic programs by finding them within the
exception for scholarship or teaching rather than creating a new and separate protected category for speech
relating to academic governance.
69

Once it is determined that the speech in question relates to a matter of public concern, it is hard to imagine
what interest of a university could outweigh the speaker’s interest in free expression, and there does not
appear to be any case that has ruled against a plaintiff in this circumstance.
70

In one pre-Garcetti case, a court held that there was no First Amendment protection for faculty speech in
the classroom because it did not relate to a matter of public concern. See Rubin v. Ikenberry, 933 F.Supp.
1425, 1443 (C.D. Ill. 1996). Another court reached the opposite conclusion. See Hardy v. Jefferson
Community College, 260 F.3d 671, 679 (6th Cir. 2001). In Adams, 640 F.3d at 564-66, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the speech involved a matter of public concern since the speech in question were writings and
advocacy on clearly public issues, not the typical sort of scholarship or classroom teaching.
71

See discussion at pp. 36-37 below.

72

See, e.g., Alves, Slip op. at 30-35; Brooks v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 406 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2005)
(objections by professors to closing of their laboratories and study programs involved merely a matter of
personal interest); Clinger v. N.M. Highlands Univ. Bd. of Regents, 215 F.3d 1162, 1166 (10th Cir. 2000)
(professor’s disagreement with processes followed in selecting president and reorganizing university did not
involve a matter of public concern).
73

In Demers, 746 F.3d at 415-17, the Ninth Circuit held that a plan for restructuring the departments of a
school of communications addressed a matter of public concern.
74

Meade v. Moraine Valley Comm. Coll., 770 F.3d 680, 684-86 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court reasoned that
because the content of the letter clearly related to matters of public concern, it did not matter that the writer
may have been motivated by a personal interest or that she might benefit from any changes in policy. See
also Smith v. The College of the Mainland, (S.D. Tex., Oct. 30, 2014), slip op. at 5-7 (holding that speech
concerning the ending of a policy of withdrawing union dues from employees’ paychecks involved a matter
of public concern).

75

As the Supreme Court recognized in upholding the free speech rights of students: “The college classroom
with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ and we break no new constitutional
ground in reaffirming this nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.” Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169, 180-81 (1972), quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
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76

See, e.g., Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992) (college violated professor’s right to free speech
in creating alternative section of his class and investigating his conduct as a result of articles and speeches
arguing that blacks are less intelligent than whites).
77

Areen, supra note 17, at 987 n. 240.

78

See Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing removal of department chair
from dismissal of tenured professor).

79

It is precisely in such areas as these where universities most resemble governmental agencies and where
the need for managerial authority to achieve effective and efficient administration becomes paramount. See
Areen, supra note 17, at 989; Clarke v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972); Ezuma, 665 F.Supp.2d at
130-31.
80

AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, at 135-40. Although jointly formulated by
the three organizations, each took a different action with respect to the Statement on Government. The
AAUP’s Council adopted it, and the AAUP’s membership endorsed it. The Board of Directors of the
American Council on Education issued a statement in which it “recognizes the statement as a significant step
forward in the clarification of the respective roles of governing boards, faculties, and administrations“ and
“commends it to the institutions which are members of the Council.” Similarly, the Executive Committee of
the Association of Governing Boards issued a statement in which it “recognizes the statement as a
significant step forward in the clarification of the respective roles of governing boards, faculties, and
administrations,” and “commends it to the governing boards which are members of the Association.”
81

http://agb.org/search/node/statement%20on%20board%20responsibility%20for%20institutional%20gover
nance. The statement was revised and updated as the AGB’s “Statement on Board Responsibility for
Institutional Governance in 2010, to which the above citation refers. However, the language quoted in the
text appears in both the 1998 and 2010 statements.
82

Areen, supra note 17, at 964-66. For an authoritative account of the history of the role of faculty in
governance and a thoughtful analysis of what that role should be, see William G. Bowen & Eugene M.
Tobin, LOCUS OF AUTHORITY: THE EVOLUTION OF FACULTY ROLES IN THE GOVERNANCE
OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2015). See also L. Bacow, N. Kopans & R. Ricker, Innovation in Teaching
and the Freedom to Teach. Ithaka S&R, http://sr.ithaka.org/?p=24987 (Dec. 19, 2014). For public
universities, the authority of the board of trustees is often set by statute, and faculty rarely challenge that
authority in court. For two unusual examples, both at The City University of New York, where the faculty
union and faculty senate contested the board’s authority over academic policy and lost, see Matter of
Polishook v. City Univ. of New York, 234 AD2d 165 (1st Dept. 1996); Professional Staff Congress v. City
Univ. of New York, 129 AD2d 472 (1st Dept. 2015).
83

444 U.S. 672 (1980).

84

Id. at 680.

85

Id. at 689.

86

465 U.S. 271 (1984).

87

The issue arose in an unusual context. Minnesota law required public employees to bargain over the terms
and conditions of employment and further required their employers to exchange views on subjects relating to
employment that were but outside the scope of mandatory bargaining only with the exclusive representatives
selected by the employees. The law was challenged by faculty members at a community college who
wanted to discuss academic matters directly with their college administration. Although again recognizing
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the arguments in favor of the value of faculty participation in governance, the Court held there was no
constitutional right to do so. Id. at 288.
88

Quite apart from what is necessary for academic freedom, faculty participation in governance is an
appropriate way to reach the best and most informed decisions, to ensure the necessary support from those
who actually deliver the services provided by universities and to create an atmosphere conducive to the
enthusiastic pursuit of scholarship and teaching. These reasons also support some faculty participation in
such “non-academic” matters as budget and facilities, where the expertise of the faculty may not always be
relevant, and a more corporate style of governance may seem appropriate. In addition, decisions in even
such financial and managerial areas often have a direct and significant impact on scholarship and teaching.

89

AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, at 139

90

Apart from personnel decisions, already discussed above, one example might be the content of a general
education curriculum where it may sometimes occur that faculty judgments are affected by the desire to
ensure an adequate number of students take courses in otherwise underutilized departments.
91

Both the 1915 Declaration and the 1940 Statement also justify tenure on the ground that by providing a
degree of security, it will attract men and women of ability to the academic profession. This is obviously a
much weaker justification, depending as it does on a policy judgment that may or may not have empirical
support.
92

AAUP, Report on the Status of Non-Tenure Track Faculty (1993),
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/comm/rep/nontenuretrack.htm. As that report makes clear, it is the AAUP’s
position that adjunct and other non-tenure track faculty should enjoy the same right to academic freedom as
full-time, tenure track faculty. Although many universities accept that general position, they usually do not
provide part-time faculty with the same procedural rights, such as a written statement of reasons for
nonreappointment. Those differences seem appropriate in light of the necessarily lesser degree of review
that can realistically be given to the process of appointing or reappointing part-time faculty. See J. Peter
Byrne, Academic Freedom of Part-Time Faculty, 27 J.C. & U.L. 583 (2001).
93

As noted above, and contrary to the inflexible language of the 1915 Declaration, it is appropriate for a
board (or administrators) to intervene where there is evidence that that decision of the faculty was the result
of bias, prejudice or other extraneous factors unrelated to proper academic judgment.
94

AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2 at 301.

95

AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2 at 4.

96

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

97

See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 437
(1971); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 191 (1952); United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 316-317
(1946).
98

See Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U. S. 551, 559 (1958).

99

See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577-78.

100

See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 544-45 (1985); Edwards, 156 F.3d at 492;
Watkins v. McConologue, 820 F.Supp. 70, 72-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Weg v. Macchiarola, 729 F.Supp. 328,
336 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
101

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972).
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102

See Loudermill, 470 U. S. at 545-46.

103

See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997); FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 241 (1988).

104

AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, at 11-30.

105

Indeed, the 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings is explicit that the
procedural standards set forth therein “are not intended to establish a norm in the same manner as the 1940
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, but are presented rather as a guide.” AAUP,
POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, at 11. Moreover, it is clear from a review of the
detailed recommendations set forth in these documents that their relation to academic freedom is remote at
best and that what the AAUP means by “academic due process” is largely a wish list of procedures favored
by faculty, many of which are quite sensible, but about which faculty have traditionally had to make their
case to their respective universities, whether in the context of collective bargaining or in governance
proceedings.
106

AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, at 25.

107

Id. at 12.

108

Byrne, supra note 11, at 262; see also Byrne, supra note 28, at 100 (“Student free speech rights against
universities reflect political values rather than academic ones.”).
109

See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (State
university, which pays for the printing expenses of other student publications, violates the First Amendment
rights of students in refusing to pay for the printing expenses of a student publication because it primarily
promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981) (State university, which makes its facilities generally available for the activities of
registered student groups, violates First Amendment rights of students in closing its facilities to a registered
student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.); Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169 (1972) (State university violates First Amendment rights of students in refusing to recognize
student political organization because of its views.). Students have similar, although somewhat more
circumscribed rights in public schools. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)(Local school
boards violate the First Amendment rights of students in removing books from library shelves solely because
they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty. Sch.Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (School policy violates First Amendment rights of students in prohibiting junior and
senior high school students from wearing armbands in protest of the Vietnam War.).
110

See, e.g., DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008); Bair v. Shippensburg University, 280
F.Supp.2d 357 (M.D. Pa. 2003); Booher v.Bd. of Regents, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11404 (E.D. Ky. Jul. 21,
1998); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1182-85 (6th Cir. 1995).
111

529 U.S. 217 (2000).

112

Id. at 233.

113

The Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, issued by the AAUP, the United States Student
Association, the Association of American Colleges and Universities, the National Association of Student
personnel Administrators and the National Association for Women in Education, includes the following
provisions:
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The professor in the classroom and in conference should encourage free discussion,
inquiry, and expression. Student performance should be evaluated solely on an academic
basis, not on opinions or conduct in matters unrelated to academic standards.
1.

Protection of Freedom of Expression
Students should be free to take reasoned exception to the data or views offered in any
course of study and to reserve judgment about matters of opinion, but they are responsible
for learning the content of any course of study for which they are enrolled.
2.

Protection Against Improper Academic Evaluation
Students should have protection through orderly procedures against prejudiced or
capricious academic evaluation. At the same time, they are responsible for maintaining
standards of academic performance established for each course in which they are enrolled.
AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, at 262.
114

See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117-21 (1972); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.

115

484 U.S. 260 (1988).

116

Id. at 273.

117

See Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), where the Court upheld the refusal of a faculty committee
to approve a master’s thesis unless the student removed the “disacknowledgements” section because it did
not meet professional standards. The Court applied to a university setting the principles of Hazelwood,
holding that “the First Amendment does not require an educator to change the assignment to suit the
student’s opinion or to approve the work of a student that, in his or her judgment, fails to meet a legitimate
academic standard.” Id. at 949.

118

http:/www.aacu.org/about/statements/academic_freedom.cfm (internal quotes omitted). See also AxsonFlynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004). In that case a Mormon student objected to certain
language she was required to say in connection with classroom acting exercises. The District Court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals held that the
Hazelwood standard requires only that restrictions on a student’s right to free expression in the classroom be
reasonable and that courts will not override a professor’s judgment unless it is a substantial departure
accepted academic norms or “where the proffered goal or methodology was a sham pretext for an
impermissible ulterior motive.” Id. at 1293. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court
because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the department requirement that the script
be strictly adhered to was based on legitimate pedagogical reasons or was a pretext for religious
discrimination. Id. at 1295.
119

For a summary of the case law involving the tension between faculty and student rights, see Cheryl A.
Cameron, Laura E. Meyers & Steven G. Olswang, Academic Bills of Rights: Conflict in the Classroom, 31
J.C. & U.L. 243 (2005).
120

See, e.g., Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 823-24 (6th Cir. 2001); Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 584
n.2 and 586 (5th Cir. 1986); Rubin, 933 F.Supp. at 1442.
121

See, e.g.,Hardy, 260 F.3d at 679 (Instructor used and solicited from students derogatory expressions
pertaining to race, sex and sexual orientation in connection with a lecture and discussion in a
communications class about words that have historically served the interests of the dominant culture in
violation against policy prohibiting the use of offensive language in class.); Silva v. University of New
Hampshire, 888 F.Supp. 293, 313 (D.N.H. 1994) (Writing instructor used sexually suggestive language and
metaphors in explaining aspects of writing in violation of sexual harassment policy.)
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122

Consider the following example that does not involve profanity, sex, religion or other hot button issues.
A professor’s style of questioning and criticizing students is harsh, and many of them find it difficult if not
impossible to learn from him. Students complain bitterly. Those who can avoid his classes do so. Those
who cannot perform poorly compared to their peers in other classes. Despite efforts to counsel him by other
faculty and administrators, the faculty member refuses to change, arguing that his pedagogical method is
entirely legitimate. His department’s personnel committee eventually decides not to reappoint him. Would
not judicial second-guessing of that result violate the core principles of academic freedom?
123

See DeJohn v. Temple University, 537 F.3d 301, 313-20 (3d Cir. 2008); Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley
College, 92 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1996). In DeJohn the Court considered a facial challenge to a sexual
harassment policy and found it overbroad because of the absence of the usual limitations that the harassing
behavior must be severe and pervasive in order to create a hostile environment. In Cohen the Court
considered the application of a sexual harassment policy to classroom teaching that contained explicitly
sexual topics and language. The policy in question was similar to the one in DeJohn. The Court found it
vague in that it did not give adequate notice that the classroom speech about which a student complained
violated the policy. In light of its holding on the vagueness issue, the Court declined “to define today the
precise contours of the protection the First Amendment provides the classroom speech of college
professors.” Id. at 971. The opinion contains no reference to any of the case law relating to the First
Amendment rights of public employees. See also Dambrot , 55 F.3d at 1182-85, where the Sixth Circuit
upheld a First Amendment challenge to the university’s discriminatory harassment policy brought by both a
basketball coach and students. Nevertheless, the Court went on to hold that the termination of the coach for
use of the word “nigger” in a locker room pep talk was permissible because his speech did not involve a
matter of public concern and was not protected by academic freedom. Id. at 1185-91.
124

“Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence”, Question L-1,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf. In an earlier guidance, OCR
addressed a question concerning students’ objections to a writing professor’s required reading list and
related class discussion of excerpts from literary classics that contained descriptions of explicit sexual
conduct, including scenes that depict women in submissive and demeaning roles. OCR opined that such
academic discourse is protected by the First Amendment even if it is offensive to some individuals; thus,
Title IX does not require a college to discipline a professor or censor a reading list or related class discussion
in such circumstances. “Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Student by School
Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, Title IX”, Section XI (“First Amendment”) (Jan. 19, 2001),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.html.
125

For example, in Hayut v. State Univ. N.Y., 352 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 2003), the court found that a professor’s
classroom comments to a female student were sufficiently offensive, severe and pervasive that a reasonable
person could conclude that he had created a hostile environment. The professor repeatedly called the student
“Monica” because of a purported resemblance to Monica Lewinsky and would ask her in class about “her
weekend with Bill” and make other sexually suggestive remarks such as “[b]e quiet Monica, I will give you
a cigar later.” The professor did not argue that his classroom comments were protected by academic
freedom, and thus the court did not express a view on the availability of such a defense. Id. at 745. The
AAUP, in its Report on Sexual Harassment - Suggested Policy and Procedures for Handling Complaints,
offers the view that sexual harassment may include classroom speech that is reasonably regarded as
offensive, substantially impairs the academic opportunity of students, is persistent and pervasive and is not
germane to the subject matter. AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, at 209.
126

See, e.g., Yacovelli v. Moser, 2004 WL 1144183 (M.D.N.C. May 20, 2004) (upheld university’s
assignment of a book about the Qu’ran in freshman orientation program); Calvary Bible Presbyterian
Church of Seattle v. Univ. of Washington, 436 P.2d 189 (Wash. 1967) (upheld university’s course in the
Bible as Literature).
127

See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991), where the court upheld restrictions on the speech
of an assistant professor of health, physical education and recreation prohibiting him from interjecting his
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religious beliefs and/or preferences during instructional time periods or conducting optional classes in which
a “Christian Perspective” of an academic topic is delivered. The Court held that the First Amendment right
to free speech of the faculty member, which it found did not include a distinct right to academic freedom,
was outweighed by the authority of the university to establish curriculum. The Court declined to reach the
Establishment Clause issue. Although the decision does not specifically state that plaintiff’s speech was not
related to the subject matter of the course, it would appear to underlie its reasoning; otherwise, it is hard to
see why the general authority of the university to establish curriculum allows it to prohibit certain classroom
speech of a faculty member consistent with the First Amendment.
128

For a recent example, see the procedures established at The City University of New York,
http://www.cuny.edu/about/administration/offices/la/PROCEDURES_FOR_HANDLING_STUDENT_CO
MPLAINTS.pdf
129

See, e.g., Carley v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 153 P.2d 1099 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting claim by
faculty member that the university violated his constitutional rights by taking into account negative student
evaluations of his teaching in deciding not to renew his contract).
130

American Historical Association, The Academic Bill of Rights, available at
http://www.studentsforacademicfreedom.org/abor.html.
131

Similar student bills of rights have been introduced in Congress and in several state legislatures. See
Cameron, Meyers & Olswang, supra note 113, at 243-47. So far none has been enacted.
132

David Beito, Ralph E. Luker and Robert K. C. Johnson, The AHA’s Double Standrd on Academic
Freedom, available at http://www.historians.org/Perspectives/issues/2006/0603/0603vie2.cfm.

133

For a more detailed critique of the Academic Bill of Rights, see the Statement on the Academic Bill of
Rights of Committee A of the AAUP, available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/comm/rep/A/abor.htm.
134

See generally AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, passim. Many of the
AAUP’s recommendations are thoughtful. However, the connection of many such recommendations to
academic freedom is not always clear or well established. Moreover, where there is little or no link between
particular AAUP policies and academic freedom, it does not seem appropriate for it to enforce them through
investigations, reports and ultimately censure, especially at universities that established different procedures
and policies in consultation or collective bargaining with their own faculty.
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